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1. Introduction 
Conflict of interest occurs on all levels of governance, ranging from local 
to global, both in the public and the corporate and financial spheres. 
Such conflict can influence decision-making in the management of 
corporations, town councils, parliaments, bureaucracies, national and 
international courts and tribunals, and in international conferences, 
organisations, and expert committees. There is increasing awareness that 
conflict of interest may distort decision-making processes and generate 
inappropriate outcomes, and thereby undermine the well-functioning of 
both public institutions and markets. But the current strong worldwide 
trend towards regulation which seeks to forestall, prevent and manage 
conflict of interest has its price. Drawbacks may be the stifling of 
decision-making processes, a loss of expertise in the person of the 
decision-makers and a vicious circle of distrust. 
So conflict of interest abounds - or is at least perceived to abound. But 
what are we actually talking about? This chapter first seeks to counter the 
fundamental objection that the concept of conflict of interest is overbroad 
and meaningless (section 2). lt then gives an overview of current conflict 
of interest regulation on all levels and spheres of governance: domestic, 
regional and global, and governmental and self-regulation (section 3). 
After recapitulating the law as it stands, the concept is probed more in 
depth: conflict of interest is a problem only in fiduciary (principal-agent) 
relationships (section 4). A typology is established: there may be a conflict 
between due and undue (especially personal and/or financial) interests, a 
conflict due to multiple roles of the agent, and a conflict arising from the 
* The author thanks Lukas Handschin and Daniel Högger for useful comments on a 
previous version of this chapter. 
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existence of multiple principals (section 5). Section 6 goes on to show that 
conflict of interest management is desirable to prevent corruption and 
bribery, which can occur in all spheres of governance: public, corporate, 
and global. Section 7 reviews existing scholarship on conflict of interest 
and explains which economic and legal phenomena have increased the 
potential for new forms of conflict of interest. lt is then pointed out that a 
holistic regulatory approach involving private, administrative, and crim-
inal law, domestic and international law, hard and soft law is obviously 
needed to manage the risk field of conflict of interest. However, insecurity 
about the correct regulatory mix, about the rules' quality, and their 
density persist. These questions can only be answered on the basis of 
cross-cutting analyses of the issue, which do not limit themselves to the 
traditional legal departments. Therefore, it is submitted, conflict of inter-
est must be studied in a comparative fashion, across different levels and 
sectors of governance. This book seeks to implement this agenda. The 
purpose of this chapter is to establish a common cross-disciplinary under-
standing of conflict of interest, which still allows the authors of this 
volume, who have a background in law, sociology, social anthropology, 
political science, philosophy and economics, to highlight and elaborate on 
definitional and conceptual aspects which are particularly relevant or 
unique to their discipline. 
2. Conflict of interest: an elusive concept 
'Conflict of interest' as a legal term is much younger than the idea it 
expresses. The old adage that one cannot serve two masters describes one 
particular type of conflict of interest ( arising out of a plurality of principals). 
In the judicial sphere, the requirements of independence and impartiality 
of the judiciary are traditional concepts for managing conflict of interest in 
the person of the judge. Nemo judex in re sua, no one should be a judge 
in his own cause, is an ancient principle which expresses this idea. Likewise, 
the term 'capture', when speaking of 'regulatory capture' or of 'richterliche 
Befangenheit ('judicial capture'), conveys the image of a rule-maker or a 
decision-maker being caught by certain interest groups. 
Conflict of interest has been defined as 'a situation in which some interest 
of a person has a tendency to interfere with the proper exercise of his 
judgement in another's behalf'. 1 The concept of conflict of interest in that 
1 Michael Davis, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 589. See on the notion of interest, p. 20 below. 
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sense relates to situations of decision-making with a practical relevance, 
such as a court's or tribunal's deliberation and adoption of a judgment, 
administrative activity, decisions of a board of directors of a corporation, 
medical decisions of a doctor, or even of surrogate decision-makers for 
comatose patients who lack decisional capacity.2 So the conflict we are 
dealing with is an intrapersonal conflict arising within a human or an 
institution which is entrusted with such decision-making. It is not a clash 
between different actors.3 
Additionally, and most importantly, it is submitted here that a conflict 
of interest is not per se present when a professional or official decision-
maker is required to take into account various, often antagonist, inter-
ests of different sectors of society. On the contrary, a judge, a regulator, 
an administrator, and a company director, should consider those various 
interests. In fact, attempting to reconcile conflicting interests is a core 
element of any regulation and administration. In particular, law is what 
comes out when conflicting interests meet in the political arena, and is 
itself a tool to deal with such interests. 
If all situations where a public, corporate, or professional decision-
maker takes conflicting interests into account were qualified as a 'conflict 
of interest', then every assessment of costs and benefits, and every 
balancing decision would involve a conflict of interest. Such an ( overly) 
broad conception then leads to the misleading statement that every 
decision-making based on consequentialist moral reasoning (and hence 
on an estimation of the relevant costs and benefits) necessarily implies a 
conflict of interest for the decision-maker.4 
But such a broad definition, on such a high level of abstraction, does 
not help in the understanding of the issue. If any decisions subject to 
multiple objectives were described as conflicted, there would be hardly 
any non-conflicted settings left. 5 The concept's explanatory value would 
be reduced to zero. 
lt is therefore preferable to pitch the concept less broadly. For 
example, the EU implementing Directive on investment firms of 2006 
mentions 'detrimental' conflict of interest, and thereby implies that 
2 See Shapiro, 'Conflict of interest at the bedside: surrogate decision-making at the end of 
life', Chapter 18 in this volume. 
3 Conflicts between different actors are the theme of Axelrod, Confiict of Interest, The 
present book has nothing to do with such conflicts. 
4 See in that sense Frank, 'Conflict of Interest', pp. 270-271. 
5 See Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses', p. 191. 
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some conflicts may be neutral or benign. 6 A different terminology for 
distinguishing 'ordinary' situations from detrimental ones might be to 
call the former one of 'conflicting interests' (mostly vested in diverse 
actors or groups confronting each other).7 
Contrary to the terminology suggested here, Jean-Bernard Auby, in 
this volume, espouses a broad notion of conflict of interest which 
encompasses situations in which the administrator balances conflicting 
interests. 8 Erhard Friedberg likewise criticises the distinction between 
'conflict of interest' and 'conflicting interests'. 9 For him, the concept of 
conflict of interest includes three key elements: the existence of different 
spheres of action, the idea of 'bridging, brokering, coordinating of 
positions' that are at the intersection of these spheres of action; and 
thirdly, the 'use of resources drawn from one sphere of action to gain 
influence in the other'. 1° Friedberg objects that the 'essentialist orienta-
tion' of distinguishing 'conflict of interest' and 'conflicting interests' does 
not contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon. 
Admittedly, my distinction excludes from scrutiny a large bulk of 
situations, and risks to reify constellations where conflicting interests 
might run or not run into a situation of conflict of interest in the narrow 
sense. On the other hand, a broad notion of conflict of interest leads to 
finding conflict of interest everywhere in social life. lt is no coincidence 
that the author who espouses such a broad notion finds that the issue 
(broadly as he conceives it) is largely one of perception and one which 
cannot be eliminated. The real problem is, according to Friedberg, 
controlling the behaviour of those who benefit from their position. So 
rather than pursue a definitional search, it is perhaps more useful to 
identify a legally significant conflict of interest, a conflict in which the risk 
of inappropriate judgements - or in the perspective of the principal-agent 
theory, the risk of agency opportunism - is most acute. 11 
6 Art. 23 of Commission Directive 2006/73 of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council as regards organisational 
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the 
purposes of that Directive (OJ 2006 L 241/26). 
7 Margolis, 'Conflict of Interest', gives Antigone as the classic example of a person 
subjected to conflicting interests, or conflicting obligations. She is tarn between king 
Kreon's commands (to leave the brother unburied) and her obligation towards the gods 
( to bury the brother) p. 361. 
8 See Auby, 'Conflict of interest and administrative law', Chapter 8 in this volume. 
9 See Friedberg, 'Conflict of interest from the perspective of the sociology of organised 
action', Chapter 2 in this volume, pp. 40-41. 
10 Ibid., p. 41. 11 Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses', p. 191. 
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3. Proliferation of conflict of interest regulation 
Regulation of conflict of interest has recently been proliferating, both on 
the level of national legislation, and on the level of global governance. In 
many countries, traditional patterns of self-regulation in the professions 
have been complemented or substituted by statutory conflict of interest 
legislation. 
3.1 Regulation on the domestic level 
The United States is probably the country with the oldest and today 
most developed conflict of interest regulation. 12 In 2006, a new law, the 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act was adopted in the US. 13 
In the same year, Canada enacted a comprehensive modern conflict of 
interest statute, which is frequently referred to as a model. 14 
With regard to the EU member states, the main empirical findings of a 
comparative study of 200715 are as follows: most states have different and 
separate rules on conflict of interest for their different institutions. Only 
rarely are there specific conflict of interest rules applying to the entire 
government sector. An example is the Seven Principles of Public Life, a not 
strictly binding code for all UK government officials. The first principle is 
'selflessness', and states: 'Holders of public office should act solely in terms 
of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or 
other benefits for themselves, their family or their friends: 16 
The new EU member states are generally more regulated than the old 
member states, with Latvia and Bulgaria, followed by Poland and 
Romania, having the highest regulation density in Europe, based on the 
12 The first law that we would now think of as a conflict of interest law was Part 2 of the Act 
to prevent Frauds upon the Treasury ofthe United States of 1853 (18 USC § 283, 10 Stat 
170). According to the Office of Government Ethics, Report to the President and to 
Congressional Committees on the Conflict of Interest Laws Relating to Executive Branch 
Employment (Washington DC, January 2006), p. 3, this law was the first attempt to 
address the ethical problems that arise when a public employee misuses his official 
position to benefit his private clients. 
13 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 14 September 2007 (Public Law 
110-181; 121 Stat 735). See for federal employees the US American Government Ethics 
Reform Act of 30 November 1989 (Public Law 101-194). 
14 Conflict of Interest Act, Statutes of Canada 2006, chapter 9, section 2, in force since 
9 July 2007, last amended on 11 July 2011. 
15 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest. 
16 Adopted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Available at www.public-standards. 
gov.uk/About/The_7 _Principles.html (last accessed 15 December 2011). 
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US model. 17 Among the old member states, Portugal is highly regulated, 
followed by the UK and Spain. Italy18 and Turkey19 have recently enacted 
or thoroughly revised regulation in the field. Countries with the least 
conflict of interest issues regulation are Austria, Denmark and Sweden. 
Following Demmke et al., four types of existing 'hard' regulation on 
conflict of interest can be distinguished. First, relevant provisions are 
found in laws applying to all institutions of a given state, such as the 
constitution, the penal code, the laws on the administration, or the civil 
service act. Secondly, the general statutes for specific institutions, such as 
central bank acts, or court of auditors acts may contain provisions 
relevant for managing conflict of interest. Thirdly, states have adopted 
specific legislation on conflict of interest applicable to all institutions in a 
state, such as the Slovenian Prevention of Corruption Act,20 or the Irish 
Ethics in Public Office Act. 21 Finally, states have enacted specific conflict 
of interest rules applicable to individual institutions, for example the 
Austrian Incompatibility Act for Government and Parliament. 22 
As to the institutional comparison in Europe, the highest regulatory 
density can be found with regard to the national central banks and for 
governments, the former institutions being often regulated by codes of 
ethics only. Parliaments are the least regulated institutions.23 The com-
parative study by Demrnke et al. concludes that parliaments are in part 
structurally under-regulated. 24 
17 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, pp. 43 and 48. Demmke et al. consider these 
states to be perhaps over-regulated. See the country profiles of twenty-seven EU member 
states in ibid., pp. 157 et seq., on Bulgaria pp. 172-178; on Latvia pp. 244-253. 
18 Legge n 215, Legge in material di risoluzione dei conflitti di interessi (Rules for the resolution 
of conflicts of interest, the 'Frattini Law') of 20 July 2004, Gazetta Ufficiale No. 193 of 
18 August 2004; English translation in Council ofEurope, Venice Commission, Opinion No. 
309/2004, Doc. CDL(2004)093rev. The law only deals with conflict of interest of persons 
holding govemment office (such as the Prime Minister and ministers). 
19 Law No. 5176 related to the Establishment of a Council of Ethics for Public Service and 
Making Modifications on Some Laws of 25 May 2004. Available at www.tbmm.gov.tr/ 
etik_komisyonu/belgeler/kanun_5176_eng.pdf (last accessed 15 December 2011). The 
Council ofEthics prepared ethical guidelines which were adopted in form of a regulation 
by the Prime Ministry on 13 April 2005 (Regulation on the Principles of Ethical 
Behaviour of the Public Officials and Application Procedures and Essentials, 
No. 25785, Official Gazette of 13 April 2005. Available at www.etik.gov.tr (last accessed 
15 December 2011). 
20 Resolution on the Prevention of Corruption in the Republic of Slovenia (RePKRS) of 
16 June 2004, No. 212-05/04-33/1. 
21 Ethics in Public Office Act of 22 July 1995, No. 22 of 1995 (Irish Statute Book). 
22 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 26. 
23 Ibid., p. 48. 24 Ibid., p. 49. 
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As to specific conflict of interest-related principles and issues, the rules 
on impartiality, on the incompatibility of posts, and on loyalty are most 
often codified, and financial disclosure is also weil regulated.25 In contrast, 
the field of post-employment is least regulated. In this regard, rules in some 
European states, in the US (strong regulation), and in Canada differ 
considerably. This issue is probably under-regulated.26 
Legal comparison reveals that France stands out. Here, legislation 
relating to conflict of interest appears outdated. The preventive aspect 
is not developed; the existing French norms focus on repression, and 
even those norms are rarely applied in practice. Against this background, 
the French President in 2010 established a 'Commission of reflexion on 
the prevention of conflict of interest in public life'. Under the heading 
'towards a novel deontology of public life', the commission's report 
highlighted glaring lacunae in the French legal system and strongly urged 
for reforms.27 Recent French scholarship has pressed in the same direc-
tion. 28 In this volume, two French contributions analyse the issue from a 
legal and sociological perspective, respectively.29 
3.2 Global and European benchmarks for states 
Conflict of interest has become a matter of international concern. For 
example, the UN General Assembly has, in the course of its action against 
corruption, adopted an 'International Code of Conduct for Public Officials' 
in 1996. The Code's first principle is that a 'public office, as defined by 
national law, is a position of trust, implying a duty to act in the public 
interest'. 30 Principle 2 of that Codedeals at length with conflict of interest 
and disqualification. Furthermore, the Council of Europe adopted a set of 
recommendations for national public administrations.31 The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published a 
25 Ibid., pp. 52, 55, 57. 26 Ibid., pp. 55-59. 
27 Commission de reflexion pour la prevention des conflits d'interets dans la vie publique, 
Pour une nouvelle deontologie de la vie publique (26 January 2011). The three-person 
Commission was chaired by Jean-Marc Sauve, vice-president of the Conseil d'Etat, and 
consulted sixty individuals, who are listed in an annex to the report. 
28 Hirsch, Pour en finir avec les conflits d'interets. 
29 Auby, 'Conflict of interest and administrative law', Chapter 8; Friedberg, 'Sociology of 
organised action', Chapter 2 in this volume. 
30 Annex to General Assembly resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996, para. 1. 
31 Council of Europe recommendation on Codes for public officials, Recommendation 
No. R (2000) 10 E, of 11 May 2000, Art. 13 - Conflict of interest. 
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'toolkit',32 and entertains an 'Observatory on Ethics and Codes of Conduct 
in OECD Countries'.33 Moreover, the European Union (EU) has com-
mended the above-mentioned comparative study of the Rules and Standards 
of Professional Ethics for the Holders of Public Office in the EU-27.34 
The EU Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) of 
2004 obliges the EU member states to require investment firms to take all 
reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest between themselves 
(induding their managers, employees and tied agents and persons under 
the firms' control) and their dients, or between one dient and another, 
that arise in the course of providing investment services, and to maintain 
and operate organisational arrangements so as to prevent them. MiFID 
and its implementing directive also provide that, where organisational or 
administrative arrangements to manage such conflict of interest are not 
sufficient, the investment firm must disclose the nature and/or the source 
of the conflict to the dient before undertaking business. 35 MiFID also 
obliges member states to require that investment firms take all reason-
able steps to obtain the best possible results for their dients, and thus 
indirectly enshrines a fiduciary obligation of loyalty.36 
3.3 Self-regulation of global and European institutions 
Recently, the international institutions have realised that conflict of 
interest is a vital issue for themselves and a problem not only of domestic 
but of supranational and global governance as well. 37 For example, the 
UN General Assembly in 2005 urged the Secretary-General to develop a 
UN system-wide Code of Ethics. 38 This code should become the princi-
pal document outlining the ethical standards to be upheld by United 
32 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Managing Conflict 
of Interest. 
33 Available at www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_34645207 _34744738_35521657 _l_ 
l_l_l,00.html (last accessed 15 December 2011). 
34 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest. 
35 Arts. 13(3) and 18 of Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (Directive 2004/39/ 
EC of the EP and the Council of 21 April 2004), OJ 2004 L 145/1; implementing 
Directive 2006/73 of 10 August 2006 (OJ 2006 L 241/26), Arts. 21-23: conflict ofinterest 
potentially detrimental to clients; conflict of interest policy; and record of services or 
activities giving rise to detrimental conflict of interest. 
36 Art. 21 MiFID. 
37 See in detail Nganga Malonga, 'Conflict of interest of international civil servants', 
Chapter 4 in this volume. 
38 See 2005 'World Summit Outcome Document' (GA Res. 60/1 (2005)), and 'Review of 
the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations' 
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Nations personnel and should complement the International Civil 
Service Commission (ICSC) standards of conduct which date from 
2002.39 The United Nations established an independent Ethics Office 
in the UN Secretariat, which commenced operation in 2006,40 and which 
produced the requested draft Code.41 The UN Secretary-General in 2011 
published a report on conflict of interest of UN staff. This report 
highlights that staff are increasingly faced with competing interests that 
may have an impact on their impartiality, and that managing conflict 
situations must become a priority for the world organisation.42 
Other international organisations have tackled the issue in their staff 
rules (such as the OECD),43 or in codes of conduct - such as the IMF,44 
(GA Res. 60/254 (2006)). See on this Code ofEthics, Auguste Nganga-Malonga, 'Conflict 
of interest of international civil servants', Chapter 4 in this volume, pp. 67-68. 
39 See Report of the International Civil Service Commission for 2009, UN Doc. A/64/30 
(2009), paras. 24--29. See also the UN StaffRegulations of7 February 2003 (Doc. ST/SGB/ 
2003/5), Art. I - Duties, obligations and privileges, Regulation 1.2: Conflict of interest: '(m) 
Staff members shall not be actively associated with the management of, or hold a financial 
interest in, any profit-making, business or other concem, if it were possible for the staff 
member or the profit-making, business or other concern to benefit from such association or 
financial interest by reason of his or her position with the United Nations'. 
40 Established pursuant to the 2005 World Summit Resolution (GA Res. 60/1, para. 16l(d)). 
41 See Annex 'Code of Ethics for United Nations Personnel', to: Activities of the Ethics 
Office, Report ofthe Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/64/316 (2009). This draft has not yet 
been adopted by the General Assembly. 
42 'Personal conflict of interest: Report of the Secetary-General', UN Doc. A/66/98 (27 June 
2011). 
43 OECD, Staff regulations, rules and instructions applicable to officials of the Organisation, 
October 2008, Title II - Basic principles, rights and duties independence and international 
character, Regulation 2: '(a) The duties of officials of the Organisation are international in 
character. Officials are subject to the authority of the Secretary-General, and are responsible to 
him for the discharge of their duties. (b) Officials shall carry out their duties and regulate their 
conduct always bearingin mind the interests of the Organisation and the international character 
of their duties. (c) Officials shall neither seek nor accept from any Member country of the 
Organisation or any source external to the Organisation any instructions. Unless authorised to 
do so, they shall neither seek nor accept, any: (i) gratuity or benefit in connection with their 
official duties or by reason of their status as an official of the Organisation; (ii) honorary 
distinction; or (iii) remuneration.' Regulation 3(a): 'Officials shall: (i) carry outtheir duties in 
accordance with the highest standards of integrity and loyalty; (ii) conduct themselves with 
objectivity andimpartiality and avoid any conflict of interest, or appearance of conflict of interest, 
in the performance oftheir duties' (emphases added). 
44 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD ), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association, and the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA): Code of conduct for board officials, effective as of 1 
November 2007, which contains a section B 'Conflict of interest policy' (Arts. 6-10) 
( adopted by the respective Executive Directors of all four universal financial organisations ). 
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which also established an IMF Ethics Officer.45 The International Law 
Association, a worldwide association of professionals, has recently 
suggested ethical standards for legal counsels which include conflict of 
interest rules for counsels appearing before international courts and 
tribunals.46 
On the level of supranational regional administration, the EU has 
tightly regulated conflict of interest for its own officers and staff. EU 
institutions have adopted more than ten different codes to regulate 
conflict of interest with regard to different groups of office-holders.47 
For example, the members of the EU Commission are subject to a Code 
of Conduct, adopted in 2011, which, inter alia, prescribes the declar-
ation of any financial and other interests, the non-financial ones (such 
as previous activities and outside activities) being made public.48 The 
EU Commission staff also has a code of good administrative behaviour. 
The very first guideline of this staff code reads: 'Staff shall always act 
objectively and impartially, in the Community interest and for the 
public good ... [T]heir conduct shall never be guided by personal or 
national interest or political pressure.'49 Also the European Parlia-
ment's Rules of Procedures of 2011 contain a rule on members' finan-
cial interests, standards of conduct, and a mandatory transparency 
register. so The rules also prescribe that '[b J efore speaking in Parliament 
or in one of its bodies or if proposed as rapporteur, any Member who 
has a direct financial interest in the subject under debate shall disclose 
this interest to the meeting orally'. 51 The ECJ has adopted a code of 
conduct for members of the Court which, inter alia, prescribes the 
declaration as to financial interests and regulates post-employment.52 
Finally, EU staff regulations explicitly regulate conflict of interest: 
'Impartiality is a fundamental principle of public service which is 
45 Terms of reference of 12 June 2008. 
46 International Law Association Study Group on the Practice and Procedure oflnternational 
Courts and Tribunals, The Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing 
before International Courts and Tribunals, 27 September 2010, principle 4. Available at 
www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/Hague_Sept2010.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2011). 
47 See in detail Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, pp. 60--66. 
48 Code ofConduct forCommissioners (C (2011) 2904), of20 April 2011, Arts. 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6. 
49 Code of good administrative behaviour for staff of the European Commission in their 
relations with the public, Commission decision of 17 October 2000 amending its Rules 
of Procedure, Annex (2000/633/EC, ECSC, Euratom), OJ 2000 L 267 /63. 
50 EP, Rules of Procedure, 7th parliamentary term, July 2011, Rule 9. 
51 Ibid., Annex I, Art. 1. 
52 Court of Justice, Code of Conduct (OJ 2007 C 223/01), Arts. 4 and 6. 
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recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. It is therefore vital to clarify the obligations of officials in 
situations where there is an actual or potential conflict of interest, both 
before and after leaving the service.' 53 
The proliferating conflict of interest regulation is embedded in 
new transparency requirements and has given rise to new forms of 
accountability. Concomitantly, new ethics bureaucracies have emerged 
which might themselves be reproached for lacking transparency and 
disregarding privacy. 54 
4. Conflict of interest and the fi.duciary relationship 
Crucially, conflict of interest is a problem only with regard to decisions 
made for someone else (the dient or the public).55 A conflict of interest 
surfaces not in every situation where a person has to respect - passively -
various interests. What is needed is an obligation to defend actively the 
interests of others. If this were not a pre-condition for using the concept 
of conflict of interest, then conflict of interest could not be distinguished 
from a simple abuse of rights. 56 
4.1 Agency and trust 
The situation is mostly analysed as a principal-agent relationship in which 
the agent first has the legal power or authority to take valid decisions on 
behalf of another person (the principal), and where he, secondly, bears a 
fiduciary duty towards that principal. The fiduciary duty may, in the private 
law world, arise from law, from contract, or flow from professional stand-
ards (self-regulation of the profession). In the public sphere, the fiduciary 
duty flows from the constitution, from law, or from the concept of public 
office ('Amf). In such a fiduciary ( or principal-agent) relationship, the 
interest which has given rise to the empowerment of the agent is never 
completely identical to the interest of the agent who holds the power to act. 
53 Art. 14 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 723/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending 
the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of 
Employment of other servants of the European Communities (OJ 2004 L 124/1). 
54 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 7. 
55 Issacharoff, 'Legal Responses', p. 189; Simonart, 'Conclusions', pp. 308-309. 
56 Simonart, 'Conclusions', p. 304. 
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Besides the concept of 'agency', the common law institution of 'trust' is 
used to describe the relationship between principal and agent, both in the 
private and the public sphere. Already John locke famously argued that 'the 
legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains 
still in the people of supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when 
they find the legislative to act contrary to the trust reposed in them'.57 The 
influential OECD guidelines on conflict of interest conceptualise office-
holders as trustees to the state and to the citizens.58 In a formalistic legal 
perspective, this parallel terminology is confusing, because probably most 
legal traditions distinguish agency from trust ( or have invented institutions 
to distinguish two types of relationship). A trustee is less constrained by his 
trustor, and enjoys discretion, whereas an agent is more tightly controlled 
and has less or no leeway. Be that as it may, in a sociological perspective, 
h . . b d 59 t ere 1s a contmuum etween agency an trust. Both terms seem appro-
priate to describe the special (fiduciary) relationship between the actor and 
the other on whose behalf he acts. To condude, fiduciary relationships are 
generally recognised in all spheres oflaw, private ( corporate), public, and 
global law. Even though these relationships are in technical terms made 
concrete with help of different legal devices, and carry different names, their 
structure is comparable. In any case, the two basic forms by which a conflict 
of interest in the person of the agent can materialise is that he either 
oversteps the limits ofhis authorisation (mandate) and acts ultra vires, or 
that he abuses his power.60 Both types of illegal action are acknowledged 
and regulated in private andin public law in different legal systems.61 
57 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, para. 149, p. 413. 
58 OECD, Managing Confiict of Interest, p. 16. 59 Cf. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, p. 18. 
60 Simonart, 'Conclusions', pp. 310-312. 
61 See on abuse of powers in administrative law, Peters, 'Managing conflict of interest: 
lessons from multiple disciplines and settings', Chapter 19 in this volume, pp. 366-368. 
See for the sphere of public governance, for example in English administrative law, 
Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law, p. 736: 'If an authority "takes into 
account irrelevant considerations which materially affect the decision reached", [ it] may 
be held to be acting ultra vires.' See for the sphere of private law the rules on ultra vires 
action of company directors, on consequences for legally binding the company and on 
the internal liability of the directors, e.g. in s. 40(1) of the English Companies Act 2006; 
for Switzerland Art. 718a ofthe Codes des Obligations; for France L. 223-18 (6) Code de 
Commerce, and for the EU Art. 9 of Directive 2009/101/EC, OJ 2009 L 258/11-19. See in 
scholarship on ultra vires contracting of corporate agents in company law Davis, 
Worthington and Micheler, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modem Company Law, 
MN 7-3. Finally, see for an example of ultra vires action in global governance the 
instances where the United Nations General Assembly ostensibly overstepped its powers 
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Building on the principal-agent theory, Guido Palazzo and Lena 
Rethel have further distinguished 'personal' ( or 'individual') from 
'impersonal' (or 'organisational') conflict of interest. An individual 
conflict of interest is due to the professional's behaviour, and located 
in the principal-agent relationship, whereas an organisational conflict of 
interest is due to the organisational structure.62 However, both types can 
overlap. An example in the financial sphere is 'late trading'. Whenever 
single employees promise late trading to a certain dient, there is a 
conflict between the interest of that dient and those of others. But 'late 
trading' can also be inherent to a financial intermediary's common 
practice and then constitute an organisational conflict.63 
4.2 Fiduciary obligations 
The most general fiduciary duties are the obligation to act in the best 
interest of the principal and the duty ofloyalty. For example, Artide 717 
Swiss Civil Code obliges the members of the board of directors and the 
executives of a stock corporation (societe anonyme) to exercise their 
mandate with 'all necessary due diligence' and 'faithful to the interests 
of the company'. 64 This provision fits into the civil law tradition of 
corporate law which has indeed conceptualised such an 'interest of the 
company'. The company's interest is, in that legal framework, the sum of 
all interests which the management has to observe when acting on behalf 
of the company. It is based ( and focuses) on the shareholder interest, but 
indudes also (to a lesser extent) the interests of other stakeholders, in 
particular the creditors of the company. In contrast, in Anglo-American 
legal orders, the obligations of management are defined with a view to 
(ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, paras. 24-35). 
62 Palazzo and Rethel, 'Conflicts of Interest', p. 12. 63 lbid., p. 15. 
64 Art. 171 CO: 'l Les membres du conseil d'administration, de meme que les tiers qui 
s' occupent de la gestion, exercent leurs attributions avec toute la diligence necessaire 
et veillent fidelement aux interets de la societe. 2 Ils doivent traiter de la meme maniere 
les actionnaires qui se trouvent dans la meme situation: (Lai federale completant le Code 
civil suisse, Livre cinquieme: Droit des obligations) of 30 March 1911, in this wording since 
1 July 1992. See also Art. 20 of the Lai federale du 23 juin 2006 sur les placements collectifs 
de capitaux (LPCC, RS 951.31). However, judicial scrutiny of such provisons is usually 
deferent. Courts typically do not find any liability of managers. See for a detailed analysis 
Bahar and Morand, 'Taking conflict of interest in corporate law seriously - direct and 
indirect rules addressing the agency problem', Chapter 17 in this volume. 
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specific principals, normally the shareholders' ('shareholderism'). 
Employees or creditors do not play apart here, or only marginally.65 
Similarly, the relevant EU Directive on undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities prescribes that '[n]o single company 
shall act as both investment company and depositary' and that '[i]n 
carrying out its role as depositary, the depositary must act solely in the 
interests of the unit-holders'. 66 
A different regulatory technique to the same end is stipulating the 
responsibility of the agent towards the principal. To illustrate this tech-
nique, an example can be taken from the sphere of global governance. 
Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 holds: 'In the 
performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not 
seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other 
authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any 
action which might reflect on their position as international officials 
responsible only to the Organization.' 
4.3 Extensions of fiduciary obligations as a source of conflict of interest 
From the perspective of the principal-agent theory, an important question 
is who the principal actually is ( or who should alternatively be regarded as a 
rightful principal for normative reasons), because this matters for the 
assessment of the relevant interests and for the disqualification of some 
( or rather someone's) interests as undue or not. For example, there seems to 
be a current trend (however quite uneven in different legal traditions) of 
corporate governance to perceive the firm not only as responsible towards 
the shareholders but also towards stakeholders.67 Notably Anglo-American 
corporate law traditionally held the shareholder's interests as primary. 
Under the heading of 'shareholder primacy', or 'shareholder value', it was 
agreed that the objective of corporations should first of all or exclusively be 
to maximise shareholder wealth. This view was in the 1980s challenged by 
the 'stakeholder theory' which claimed that shareholders are only one of 
many competing and diverse groups that have an interest in the affairs of a 
company, including employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, investors, 
65 See on shareholderism and stakeholderisms text accompanying FN 68 below. 
66 
Art. 17 of the Council Directive of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective invest-
ment in transferrable securities (UCITS Directive), 85/611/EEC, OJ 1985 L 375/3. 
67 See a useful sceptical overview by Keay, 'Moving Towards Stakeholderism?'. 
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and the local and national government.68 All social groups who are 
affected or might be affected by a company's decisions are in that view 
the company's stakeholders. The idea is then that managers must at least 
take into account and balance the interests of all these stakeholders in 
their business decisions. In a more extreme form of stakeholderism, 
these persons have genuine rights, and must be allowed to participate in 
corporate decision-making. As far as employees are concerned, this is 
realised notably in German corporate law (regime of codetermination), 
and also in Japan. The stakeholder theory is directly relevant for assess-
ing conflict of interest management in corporate governance, because it 
determines whose interests may and even must be duly taken into 
account, and whose interests would be 'undue' in the sense described 
above. Along the line of 'stakeholderism', public opinion and the media 
in a vague and untechnical sense are more and more inclined to assume 
that (big) business must also further some kind of 'public' interest. This 
ongoing expansion of corporate duties of loyalty 'creates stress', as 
corporate lawyers have rightly pointed out. 69 The broader the group of 
stakeholders becomes, the more the fiduciary duty of loyalty is 
expanded, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish due from undue 
interests, and the greater is the potential for conflict of interest. 
The same trend is visible with regard to certain professions which are 
formally regulated by private law, and which are exercised by private 
actors, but where diligent performance is highly relevant for society at 
large. For example, engineers or accountants have individual (private) 
clients, but they also bear a responsibility to the public. While they are 
not contractually responsible towards society, it might be said that in a 
sociological sense their private-party principals are replaced either 
wholly or partially with the public.70 
Finally, a parallel debate is taking place in the sphere of global governance 
where it is asked whether international organisations should be directly 
accountable to citizens, and not only to member states. This would encom-
pass, inter alia, holding them liable for human rights violations, and also 
lifting or restricting their immunity before national courts.71 
68 Seminally Freeman, Strategie Management. 
69 Thevenoz and Bahar, Conflict of Interest, p. 7. It has also been criticised that the talk of 
'stakeholders' is a means to escape accountability towards minority shareholders. 
70 Stark, 'Comparing Conflict of Interest across the Professions', p. 343. 
71 Peters, 'The Constitutionalization of International Organizations'. 
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4.4 Comparative conclusions 
To sum up, fiduciary relationships, which are at the origin of conflict of 
interest, exist in all branches of law, and in all spheres of govemance. 
Within such relationships, the decision-makers ('agents') are expected to 
make decisions according to the established and accepted standards (legal, 
professional and ethical) andin fulfilment of their institutional role. They 
owe professional ( contract-based) and/or legal or constitutional obliga-
tions towards certain groups (their clients or 'principals'), notably general 
obligations ofloyalty. Interests of other groups ( or of the decision-maker 
himself) may have an impact on either the decision-making process or on 
the outcome or on both. Decision-making processes and outcomes which 
are 'tainted' by that impact constitute a breach of the fiduciary obligations. 
The ongoing, but controversial trend, in various spheres of govemance, 
ranging from corporate law to the law of international organisations, to 
expand fiduciary obligations ( or at least moral responsibilities), beyond 
concrete main principals so that they might exist vis-a-vis other groups or 
to the public at large, and the controversies about who the rightful 
principals should be, give rise to new types of conflict of interest. 
5. Typology 
In practice, regulators have addressed typical conflict of interest constella-
tions, notably accepting benefits (gifts etc.); outside employment or other 
outside activities, post-employment, self-dealing, 'influence peddling',72 
using govemment property and using confidential information. With 
regard to legal representatives (e.g. solicitors), the following constellations 
of conflict of interest have been identified: the existing client conflict 
(in simultaneous representation), the former dient conflict (in the event 
of successive representation), and the personal conflict (i.e. the conflict 
between client's interest and personal interest). 73 Upon examination it 
becomes apparent that these constellations are structured differently. Both 
the underlying 'conflict' and the underlying 'interests' differ. In more 
abstract terms, three types of conflict of interest, which overlap, can be 
distinguished. 
72 
'Influence peddling' (or 'trading in influence') is the situation where a person in a 
position of power possesses confidential information or simply has useful connections 
which he exploits to give an improper advantage to another organisation or person. 
73 
Hollander and Salzedo, Conflicts of Interest, pp. 1-4. 
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5.1 The conflict between due and undue interests 
As stated above (p. 5), not every intra-personal conflict of interest is 
legally relevant. A conflict of interest in the narrower sense, the subject of 
this book, is present only when there is a peculiar kind of conflict which 
has to do with the nature of the interests conflicting, and with their 
relationship in the concrete context.74 
The canonical OECD definition of a public-sector conflict of interest 
holds that the conflict arises when public officials have private-capacity 
interests 'which could improperly influence the performance of their 
duties'.75 Similarly, the recent Code of Conduct for members of the 
British government states that the government should 'act in the 
national interest, above improper influence'.76 Here we find an implicit 
distinction between proper and improper influence, and - one could 
add - between proper and improper interests coming into play. Along 
the same line, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption obliges state parties to criminalise the promising, giving, 
or offering, of any undue advantage to anyone asserting or confirming 
'that he or she is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-
making' of public or private decision-makers. 77 This provision, although 
directed at one specific form of corruption, namely trading in influence, 
again presupposes that there are proper and im proper factors ( or inter-
ests) which might influence decision-making. 
Granted, there are no a priori illegitimate or 'improper' or 'undue' 
interests in a society. Nevertheless, some interests may, in a concrete 
context, not be reasonably connected to the decision at hand to be 
taken. Then these interests are in that specific context undue, inappro-
priate, or alien, and may constitute an 'improper' influence, as the 
OECD toolkit and the UK Ministerial Code, both cited above, put it. 
74 Cf. Margolis, 'Conflict ofinterest', p. 362: 'Where ... we have a conflict of interest, one or the 
other interest may not be independently legitimate ... In a conflict of interest, it is then, 
precisely the relationship ofthe putative interests that is essential' (emphasis added). 
75 OECD, Managing Conflict of Interest, p. 7 (emphasis added). The French wording is 
'susceptible d'influencer indument l'execution des obligations'. Referring to this defin-
ition, the French Commission de reflexion highlights that the interests must be susceptible 
to impact unduly on the fulfilment of the obligations of a public official ( Commission de 
reflexion (n 28), p. 16). 
76 UK, Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office, May 2010 (emphasis added). 
77 Art. 12 ofthe Council ofEurope Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173 
(27 January 1999) (emphasis added). 
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These are called 'alien factors' or 'alien interests' in US administrative 
law, 78 or 'sachfremd' to use a German term. 
Based on this insight, we can identify as a first type of conflict of interest 
(in the narrow sense) the conflict between due and undue interests which 
may influence the decision-making process and its outcome. 79 In principal-
agent analyses of conflict of interest, the principal's interest is often called 
the 'primary' interest, that is the interest which should 'officially' be pursued 
by the agent. The agent has his 'secondary' interest.80 The agent may be a 
professional or an office-holder. The principal may be a dient in a private 
law relationship, or - for holders of public office - the public. 
What are these interfering 'secondary' and in the concrete context 
'undue' interests? 'Interest' has been defined as 'any influence, loyalty, 
concern, emotion, or other feature of a situation'81 or as comprising 
'financial gains' and 'other personal benefits which might be psycho-
logical, social, or political'. 82 So the secondary interest may be financial 
or personal ( such as the pursuit of professional advantages), but also the 
desire to favour friends, family, colleagues or students. 
A typical source for a conflict of interest of this type arises from the 
decision-maker's membership or affiliation to particular groups.83 Such 
relations - be they of a family, business, or otherwise social nature - are 
prone to giving rise to conflicts because they suscitate the decision-
maker's desire to favour the involved persons themselves or the interests 
they represent, and thereby interfere with his or her judgement. 
In all spheres of governance, legal norms, codes of conduct, and 
self-regulatory instruments contain standard formulas which seek to 
prevent actual interference of the alien interest with the judgement, 
and also the appearance of this. To give but an example from the legal 
profession (thus the private-law sphere), statutes on legal counsels 
usually stipulate that counsels should exercise their profession in due 
78 
Fehling, Verwaltung zwischen Unparteilichkeit und Gestaltungsaufgabe, pp. 20-21 and 
p. 506, with further references. 
79 
This is similar but not identical to what Andrew Stark has called an 'out of role conflict' 
(Stark, 'Comparing Conflict ofinterest', pp. 335-336). 
80 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), Conftict of Interest in Medical Research, Education and 
Practice. See Davis, 'Empirical research on conflict of interest: a critical look', Chapter 3 
in this volume. 
81 
Davis, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 590. 82 Hejka-Ekins, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 482. 
83 
These groups may be outsiders to the principal-agent relationship, but they might also 
be the principals themselves (such as clients of a professional or the parties to a law suit 
tobe decided by a judge). 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CROSS-CUTTING PROBLEM 21 
diligence and should avoid any conflict of interest between the interests 
of their clients and those of other persons to whom they stand in a 
business or private relationship. 84 
With regard to the sphere of public governance, some additional 
observations can be made. The situation where officials use their public 
office in order to satisfy private interests might be called 'top down' 
conflicts. This affects the 'output' side of democratic governance. 
In contrast, 'bottom-up' conflicts of interest are present when a candi-
date exploits private interests ( especially through campaign funding) 
in order to acquire art elected office. This affects the 'input' side of 
d · 85 emocrat1c governance. 
In the background of the uncertainty of the concept about conflict of 
interest in the public sector are divergent conceptions of the public 
office, and concomitantly of the 'public interest'. In the French tradition 
the official is deemed impermeable for private interests. He is - as an 
ideal type - by definition neutral and impartial. He serves a public and 
general interest which is, in the French voluntarist conception, 'absolute', 
that is completely independent from particular or private interests.86 
This means that all intetests entering from the outside into this 'shell' are 
extraneous. In contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of governance, the 
public interest is seen as flowing from the confrontation of competing 
goods, including private interests.87 
To conclude the reflection on 'due' and interfering 'undue' interests: 
for sure, we do not expect and do not want decision-makers to exercise 
their judgement in a social vacuum. They should not be completely 
disinterested. But they should not allow undue, 'alien' interests to impact 
on the decision. A conflicted decision-maker is someone who is for one 
of the mentioned reasons prone to letting such undue interests influence 
his or her decision. 
84 See Art. 12 ofthe Swiss Lai federale sur la libre circulation des avocats (SR 935.61), 23 June 
2000: 'Rules of Professional Conduct: The following rules of professional conduct are 
applicable to lawyers: a. They shall exercise their profession conscientiously and with 
diligence. b. They shall exercise their profession independently, in their own names and 
on their own responsibility. c. They shall avoid every conflict of interest between that of 
dient and persons with whom they have business or private relations' (translated into 
English by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe). 
85 Guzzetta, 'Legal Standards and Ethical Norms', p. 24. 
86 Commission de reflexion (n 28), p. 66. 87 Cf. Weale, 'Public Interest', p. 833. 
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Undue personal interests 
The prototypical case of undue interests in that sense are personal 
interests of the holder of a public office who has to take formal decisions 
for the state, for example on construction permits. 88 The idea of conflict 
of interest rests on the premise that such personal interests should not 
bear on the outcome of the decision. Consequently, the traditional 
narrow understanding of conflict of interest focused on the conflict 
between an office-holder's obligation to take decisions in the public 
interest and his personal, notably pecuniary interests. In that sense, the 
OECD has defined as follows: 'A "conflict of interest" involves a conflict 
between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in 
which the public official has private-capacity interests which could 
improperly influence the performance of their official duties and respon-
sibilities.'89 Along the same line, the Council of Europe's recommenda-
tion on Codes for public officials of 2000 states: 'l. Conflict of interest 
arises from a situation in which the public official has a private interest 
which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and 
objective performance of his or her official duties.'90 The OECD defin-
ition has become canonical, and has been used as a starting point in 
subsequent studies and reports on conflict of interest. 91 
With regard to the private-law sphere of corporate governance and the 
professions, conflicts may arise which have the same structure as the 
'OECD-constellation'. Here a conflict of interest is present when a 
88 Cf. the case study by Dobler, 'Private vices, public benefits? Small town bureaucratisation 
in Namibia', Chapter 12 in this volume. 
89 OECD, Managing Conflict of Interest. See in scholarship Hejka-Ekins, 'Conflict of 
Interest', p. 481: 'Situations where public employees encounter opportunities to use their 
public office for the sake of their own private gain.' Warren perceives a conflict of interest 
'when a public servant uses an office for personal gain by paying special favors to private 
interests in exchange for payments of some kind (money, products, services)' and 'when 
a public official uses governmental position to benefit individual private interests 
( commonly, private business interests) or the interests of the government worker's family 
or friends.' Warren, Administrative Law, p. 175. 
9° Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation on Codes of conduct 
for public officials, Recommendation 10 of 11 May 2000, Art. 13 - Conflict of interest 
91 , . 
Relymg on the OECD definition, e.g. Commission de reflexion (n 28), p. 13. The 
commission then goes on to define conflict of interest (for a public agent) as following: 
'Un conflit d'interet est une situation d'interference entre une mission de service et 
l'interet prive d'une personne qui concourt a l'exercise de cette mission, lorsque cet 
interet, par sa nature et son intensite, peut raisonnablement etre regarde comme etant de 
nature a influencer ou paraitre influencer l' exercise independant, im partial et objectif de 
ses fonctions' (ibid., p. 19). 
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professional's decisions which he should take solely with respect for the 
contractual and legal obligations and the professional standards 
governing his activity are unduly influenced by his private interests. 
For example, the director of a firm who extends a contract offer to the 
enterprise managed by a friend and not to the best qualified supplier is 
prone to being influenced by his private relationship. 
But the matter is more complicated, because not all private interests 
are inevitably 'undue' interests which taint the decision-making pro-
cesses and should therefore be strictly banned. For example, although a 
requirement of any employment and of public office is that the employee 
or the office-holder should work for the good of the organisation ( or of 
the relevant community), the decision-maker's secondary interest in 
individual promotion and success is in principle considered equally 
legitimate.92 In fact, this secondary interest may be a powerful stimulus 
for performing a good job for the organisation or employer. So it could 
be said that the secondary interest here is not in 'conflict' with the 
primary one but on the contrary reinforces it. 93 However, that secondary 
interest in promotion, success, and making money can turn itself against 
the primary interest if remuneration schemes incite agents to take too 
risky decisions. This problem will be discussed next. 
Undue financial interests 
An important potential for conflict of interest in form of a temptation to 
let a personal pecuniary interest impact (in a detrimental fashion) on a 
professional or official decision lies in financial arrangements and com-
pensation schemes. According to a recent study on conflict of interest in 
the financial sector, compensation schemes are one of the main sources 
of conflicts of interest here. 94 Indeed, financial incentives may attract 
the wrong type of people to the job, or they crowd out other values such 
as integrity and intrinsic motivation.95 Managers may feel tempted to 
'cook the book' and engage in fraudulent activities to boost their 
profits.96 Performance-based remuneration of managers may also lead 
them to engineer false expectations and to create an appearance of 
92 Hejka-Ekins, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 482. 
93 Friedberg, 'Sociology of organised action', Chapter 2 in this volume, p. 50. 
94 Thevenoz and Bahar, Conflict of Interest, p. 8. 95 Ibid., p. 12. 
96 See in detail Handschin, 'Conflict of interests related to management and board 
payments - profit-based remuneration systems make things worse', Chapter 16 in this 
volume. 
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overperformance. As a result, the entire market may lose confidence in 
the accuracy of financial reports on the performance of companies. Also 
asset managers are subject to wrong incentives through the structure of 
their compensation. These favour 'churning portfolios', i.e. generating 
excessive trading to increase revenue. Finally, financial analysts' remu-
neration schemes for their research may generate conflict of interest. The 
analysts' earnings forecasts will be influenced by their desire to attract 
investment banking clients if their bonuses depend on the overall per-
formance of the firm. 97 Only recently, the business world has developed 
sufficient sensibility for these at-risk situations. 
More generally, already the fact that someone ( either the person or group 
to whom the fiduciary obligation is owed, or a third party) pays might cause 
a conflict of interest: 'He who pays the piper calls the tune' or, in German: 
'Wess Brot ich ess, des Lied ich spiel'. The <langer of an indirect distortion of 
judgement through financial dependency is especially obnoxious for all 
decision-makers whose task it is to adjudicate, i.e. to settle disputes between 
two parties. These are in the public sphere the judges, in global govemance 
international judges and quasi-judges such as human rights treaty body 
members,98 and in the private and semi-private sphere arbitrators.99 The 
work of these dispute-settlers, which need not only be independent, but 
additionally impartial, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 19. 
Moreover, the requirement of independence, especially financial inde-
pendence, is crucial to guarantee the performance of jobs which do not 
consist in adjudicating between two parties but which still require an 
objective assessment, such as bond rating firms and auditors. A recent 
study found that conflicts of interest in auditing 'have become truly 
egregious'. 100 The mere <langer of not being hired any more in the future 
if a negative audit prediction is delivered leads to practices showing the 
auditors' disposition to produce positive results, for example 'low-
balling'.101 That study identified two main factors which exacerbate the risk 
of conflict: the smail size of the auditing firm102 and a long-standing 
97 Palazzo and Rethel, 'Conflicts of Interest', pp. 16-17. 
98 Davala, 'Conflict of interest in universal human rights bodies', Chapter 7 in this volume. 
99 See in detail Reinisch and Knahr, 'Conflict of interest in international investment 
arbitration', Chapter 6 in this volume; Peters, 'Managing conflict of interest', Chapter 
19 in this volume, at pp. 364-368. 
. 
100 Moore et al, 'Conflicts oflnterest and the Case of Auditor Independence', p. 11. 
101 Ibid., p.15. 
102 
The likelihood of delivering whitewashed reports in order to establish a lang relation-
ship decreases with the growing size of an auditing company. 
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relationship with the client. 103 Because of proneness of auditors to conflict 
of interest, the EU Commission in 2002 adopted a set of fundamental 
principles on statutory auditors' independence in the EU. 104 Here the 
Commission highlighted that 'the independence of statutory auditors is 
fundamental to the public confidence in the reliability of statutory auditors' 
reports'. 105 The Commission directive contains rules on how to deal with 
'independence threats and risks', including self-interest.106 
Undue non-personal interests 
Some students of the issue and some regulators apply a narrow concept of 
conflict of interest and define as a conflict of interest only those situations 
where the intervening secondary interest is a personal interest of the 
decision-maker, hence an interest held directly or indirectly by him. 107 
In contrast, this volume also deals with settings where the intervening 
secondary interest is a public or professional interest. Benjamin Schindler, 
in this volume, distinguishes two main types of undesirable or undue 
interests, personal interests of public officials and particular (as opposed 
to general) interests, for example the interests of farmers seeking subsidies 
(as opposed to the entire population), or of specific industries. 108 
Taking the concept even one step further than Schindler, it is submitted 
that public or professional interests (as opposed to purely personal inter-
ests) may in a concrete decision-making context be 'undue' as weil, and 
even if they are not only 'particular' interests. For example, the city of 
Zurich's police prohibited the local shopkeepers to seil alcohol-to-go across 
the counters during a soccer match for fear of hooliganism. This 
103 Independence decreases with the langer lasting relationship, because a common identity 
among auditor and dient is formed. 
104 'Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles', 
EU Commission recommendation of 16 May 2002, Doc. No. C (2002) 1873, OJ 2002 
L 191/222. 
105 Ibid., Preamble, para. 2. 
106 To that end, the Commission Directive prescribes, inter alia, the disposal of financial 
interests of auditors that might threaten auditor independence, the prohibition of 
business relationships between auditors and dient, the exdusion of dual employment 
in the audit firm and its dient, the exdusion of a managerial or supervisory role of the 
auditor over its dient, the exdusion of employment of a director or manager of the 
dient in the audit firm, and finally the exdusion from an audit team of an auditor with 
family or other personal relationships to the dient. 
107 See in this sense Commission de reflexion (n 28), pp. 17-18; Part l, s. 4 of the Canadian 
Conflict of Interest Act, Statutes of Canada 2006, chapter 9, section 2. 
108 Schindler, 'Conflict of interest and the administration of public affairs - a Swiss 
perspective', Chapter 9 in this volume. 
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administrative prohibition was qualified as illegal by the administrative 
tribunal. The reason was that in this concrete regulatory context, taking into 
account the general interest in safeguarding public order in the street 
should not have entered the discretionary decision concerning the licence 
to run a restaurant, because it was simply not sufficiently related to the 
legislative objective of the relevant local statute on restaurants and thus 
should not be allowed to influence the implementation of that statute. 109 
Non-personal, but nevertheless 'undue' interests are especially rele-
vant for those decision-makers whose institutional role is tobe a neutral 
arbiter between two antagonist parties, such as a judge. Although socio-
logically, the person of the judge can hardly be impartial, the judge (as 
an office) by legal definition is. 110 Here a typical source of conflict of 
interest is previous and current activity of judges, including publications 
and statements in the media. Such activity often manifests the decision-
maker's attitude on certain issues and therefore gives rise to the suspi-
cion that his opinion has already been formed, which would betray his 
institutional function. 
5.2 Multiple roles or multiple principals 
A second type of conflict of interest arises when a decision-maker simul-
taneously fulfils two (acknowledged and official) roles, where individuals 
'wear two hats' at a time. 111 The traditional constitutionalist concept of 
separation of powers in states (between the legislative, executive and 
adjudicative power) seeks exactly to forestall these kinds of role conflicts 
(and the ensuing conflict of interest). An example for the conflict arising 
out of two accepted roles is the activity of Swiss parliamentarians 
deciding on the admissibility of a popular initiative as judges, while 
remaining politicians with an ideological and strategical agenda. 112 
Wearing two hats is especially prone to generate conflict of interest, 
when this comprises on the one hand neutral activity and on the other 
hand a partial activity. The prime example is a university teacher who 
must grade his or her students, but also write recommendations for 
109 
Administrative Tribunal (Verwaltungsgericht) of the Canton Zurich, decision of 20 
August 2008, VB.2008.00183. 
110 
See in detail on the impartiality of judges Peters, 'Managing conflict of interest', Chapter 
19 in this volume, pp. 371-379. 
111 
Stark, 'Comparing Conflict ofinterest', pp. 336-341; Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, pp. 4-5. 
112 
Christmann, 'Politicians as judges? Conflict of interest in the Swiss Parliament during 
decisions on the validity of popular initiatives', Chapter 11 in this volume. 
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them to push them on the job market. Also, the professors' grading 
might be influenced by their desire to attract students ( a desire which is 
fostered by modern universities' performance-based allocation of 
resources to the teacher), and tobe popular among students. 
A third type of conflict of interest exists when a decision-maker serves 
two different principals. Palazzo and Rethel have called this an 'imper-
sonal conflict of interest' or a 'principal-principal conflict', where 'agents 
are confronted with colliding interests of different principals'. 113 Unlike 
in the first type of conflict, here the interests ( towards both sides) are 
primary, because they are central to the fiduciary relationships. 114 
Principal-principal conflicts of interest raise moral concern because 
such conflicts make it more difficult for the agent to be objective in 
evaluating the interests of both sides; thus, the clients are less certain that 
the agent will act in their best interest. 115 Of course this principal-
principal conflict may coincide with a conflict of the first type; the agent 
may additionally be driven by the desire to obtain personal gains. 
The prototype of a principal-principal conflict is the situation of a legal 
counsellor who counsels both adversaries in a litigation. 116 Another 
example would be the member of a company's board of directors 
who at the same time represents a huge creditor of that company. And 
because a typical source of conflict arising from multiple principals is 
side-employment, most statutes on the civil service and public officials 
proscribe ancillary private employment. 117 
113 Palazzo and Rethel, 'Conflicts of Interest', p.12. 
114 'lt need not, of course, actually be the case that one or the other interest, in a conflict of 
interest, be illegitirnate or illegal; the clairn of [ this type of] a conflict is, rather, that it is 
morally wrong or illegal or illegitimate to serve both interests.' Margolis, 'Conflicting 
lnterests', p. 362. 
115 Hicks, 'Conflict of Interest', p. 183. 
116 See Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, chapter 5 'Other clients', pp. 134-169. 
117 See for instance the French general statute on the public administration (Loi du 13 juillet 
1983, statut general de la fonction publique), Art. 25: '1.-Les fonctionnaires et agents non 
titulaires de droit public consacrent l'integralite de leur activite professionnelle aux 
tiches qui leur sont confiees. Ils ne peuvent exercer a titre professionnel une activite 
privee lucrative de quelque nature que ce soit.' (Amended by loi n°2009-972 du 3 aout 
2009 - Art. 33; loi n°2009-972 du 3 aout 2009 - Art. 34). See for Switzerland Loi du 21 
mars 1997 sur l'organisation du gouvernement et de l'administration (LOGA) of21 March 
1997 (RS 172.010), Art. 60 ('Incompatibilite a raison de la fonction'); for the SWiss 
federal judiciary: Loi du 17 juin 2005 sur le Tribunal federal (LTF) (RS 173.110), Art. 6 
('Incompatibilite a raison de la fonction'). See for the US: Office of Government Ethics, 
Report to the President and to Congressional Committees on the Conflict of Interest Laws 
Relating to Executive Branch Employment (Washington DC, January 2006). 
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Susan Shapiro relates that Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis was, 
as a nominee, questioned by the US Senate on a transaction he had been 
involved in on various sides, representing the estate, and descendant, and 
the shareholders, and the heirs all at once. Brandeis was asked who 
exactly he represented in this case. Brandeis was said to have answered: 
'I was the attorney for the situation.' 118 Today, due to heightened sens-
ibilities and strict regulation, such lawyering 'for the situation' is in most 
legal systems no longer permitted. 
The cases of fulfilling multiple roles, or of serving multiple principals, 
seen through the lenses of 'undue' interests, present themselves as just 
special cases of a type-one conflict. The interest of the actor with his second 
hat, or the interest of the other principal are, in concrete situations, 'undue'. 
6. Conflict of interest management as prevention of corruption 
and bribery - in all spheres of governance 
Current political concern over conflict of interest is fuelled by the insight 
that situations of conflict of interest contain a particularly high risk of 
corruption and bribery. Conflict of interest is a situation in which an alien 
or undue interest could improperly influence the public interest activities 
and decisions ( or activities and decisions taken in the best interest of a 
private sector entity). The existence of a conflict of interest is not in itself 
unfair, but may hold a potential for unfair behaviour, in short: for corrup-
tion. Therefore, as the Australian Anti-Corruption Commission put it: 
'[F)ailure to identify, declare and manage a conflict of interest is where 
serious corruption often begins and this is why managing conflicts of 
interest is such an important corruption prevention strategy.' 119 Import-
antly, this strategy has been pursued across all spheres of governance, and is 
itself a manifestation of the ongoing blurring of the spheres (public and 
private, domestic and global). 
6.1 Corruption 
The term corruption is not a term of criminal law, but a sociological one. 
Corruption is a shorthand reference for a range of illicit or illegal 
activities. Corruption is, in short, the abuse of authority (be it granted 
118 Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, p. 80. 
119 
Independent Commission against Corruption and Crime, Managing Public Ethics in the 
Public Seetor, Guidelines (Sydney, 2004), p. 7. 
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in the public sphere or in the private sphere) for private purposes. 120 
Originally, the term corruption was used to designate the abuse of public 
authority. 121 Along that line, a definition by Transparency International, 
the leading NGO in the global anti-corruption effort, is: 'Corruption 
involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether 
politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully 
enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce other to do so, 
by misusing the position in which they are placed.' 122 
Since the 1990s, the concept of corruption has been extended to the 
private sphere. Notably the Council of Europe's Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption defines 'corruption' as including the private sector, in the 
following terms: "'Corruption" means requesting, offering, giving or 
accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage 
or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or 
behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the 
prospect thereof.' 123 Also the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion (UNCAC) of 2003 regulates corruption both in the public and in the 
private sector. 
UNCAC lists the prevention of conflict of interest as one of the 'prevent-
ive measures' to combat corruption. With regard to public officials, the 
Convention foresees the adoption of codes of conduct, as 'measures and 
systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate 
authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, 
investment, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict 
of interest may result with respect to their function as public officials'. 124 
With regard to the private sector, the Convention suggests to state parties 
'the development of standards and procedures designed to safeguard the 
integrity of relevant private entities, including codes of conduct for ... the 
prevention of conflicts of interest'. 125 Anti-corruption measures may 
120 Pieth, 'Korruption', para. 14. 
121 The widely accepted definition of corruption proposed by the World Bank is: 'The abuse 
of public office for private gain' (World Bank Group, Helping Countries Combat Corrup-
tion: The Role of the World Bank (September 1997), p. 8 (emphasis added). 
122 Jeremy Pope (ed.), The Transparency International Sourcebook, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
123 Art. 2 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 174 of 4 November 1999 (emphasis 
added). 
124 Art. 8 s. 5 United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2003 
(UNCAC), entered into force on 14 December 2005, United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 2349, p. 41; UN-Doc. A/58/422. 
125 Art. 12 s. 2 lit. e) UNCAC. 
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include 'preventing conflicts of interest by imposing restrictions, as appro-
priate and for a reasonable period of time, on the professional activities of 
former public officials or on the employment of public officials by the 
private sector after their resignation or retirement, where such activities or 
employment relate directly to functions held or supervised by those public 
officials during their tenure'. 126 
Corruption has been acknowledged as one of the most important obs-
tacles to sustainable development and the rule oflaw. 127 For example, both 
Council of Europe Conventions on Corruption emphasise 'that corruption 
represents a major threat to the rule oflaw, democracy, and human rights, 
fairness and social justice, hinders economic development and endangers 
the proper functioning of market economics'. 128 Combating corruption is 
therefore a high priority of global politics and governance, ultimately in the 
interest of global peace, the international rule oflaw, prosperity, and human 
well-being. Preventing corruption must start by addressing the situations 
favouring it, notably situations of conflict of interest. 
6.2 Bribery as a criminal form of corruption 
The offer of bribes often creates a conflict of interest, because the bribed 
person has an interest in receiving and keeping the bribe. When a 
decision-maker accepts a bribe, he succumbs to the 'undue' interest 
and allows it to 'taint' his decision - independently of whether the 
outcome ( the decision itself) is in conformity with the law, and factually 
correct. 129 Combating bribery is therefore one clear-cut and traditional 
strategy in the broad field of conflict of interest regulation. The French 
criminal offence of 'unlawful taking of interests' ('prise illegale d'interets') 
is an illustration of that connection.130 'Unlawful taking of interests' is a 
126 Ibid. 
127 Foreword by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the UNCAC 2003: 'Corruption ... 
undermines democracy and the rule oflaw ... is a major obstacle to poverty alleviation 
and development.' See in this sense also the preamble of GA Res. 58/4 of 31 October 
2003 ( endorsing UNCAC), and the preamble of UNCAC itself. In scholarship Nadaka-
vukaren Schefer, 'Causation'. 
128 There is an identical paragraph in the preambles of Council of Europe, Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173 (of27 January 1999); Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption, ETS No. 174 (of 4 November 1999). 
129 See in detail on motives, appreciation, and process, Peters, 'Managing conflict of 
interest', Chapter 19 in this volume, pp. 364-371. 
13° French criminal code ( Code penal), consolidated version of 19 May 2011, para. 3 on 
'unlawful taking of interests' ('De la prise illegale d'interets'), Art. 432-12: 'The taking, 
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specific French infraction for public officials, which is unique among 
OECD countries. French courts and administrative tribunals have inter-
preted it broadly, and applied it in a sweeping manner, with stiff 
penalties. The notion 'interet quelconque' (any interest whatever) crim-
inalises the taking into consideration of all kinds of alien interests, 
independent of their intensity or lacking intensity. 131 
The legal approach to bribery manifests an erosion of the various 
spheres of governance: public and private, national and international. 
After the break-down of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the rise 
of Africa and Asia as production and investment sites it became apparent 
that a harmonised legal regime of bribery of foreign officials would be 
needed to level the playing field for the corporations of the capital 
exporting states of the North and West. Levelling that playing field was 
the main rationale for the elaboration of the OECD Anti-bribery Con-
vention which was adopted in 1997. Thereby, part of the regulation of 
bribery has been transferred to the international level. Both levels of 
governance, international and domestic, must now play together. 
A second boundary, the one between public and private, has been 
blurred as well. Initially, bribery was understood as necessarily involving 
bribing a public officer. For example, the OECD Anti-bribery Conven-
tion of 1997 only addresses the bribery of (foreign) public officials, and 
only the action of the person who promises or gives the bribe (so-called 
active bribery), not on the receiver's side (so-called passive bribery). 132 
receiving or keeping of any interest [ un interet quelconque] in a business or business 
operation, either directly or indirectly, by a person holding public authority or dischar-
ging a public service mission, or by a person holding a public electoral mandate who at 
the time in question has the duty of ensuring, in whole or in part, its supervision, 
management, liquidation or payment, is punished by five years' imprisonment and a 
fine of €75,000' (emphasis added). 
131 Commission de reflexion (n 28), pp. 30-40. 
132 The OECD Convention endorses the following definition ofbribery: lt is an offence of 
bribery 'for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or 
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a ... public official, for 
that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage'. Art. 1 sec. 1 of OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, signed on 17 December 
1997, entered into force on 15 February 1999. So the OECD Convention does not seek 
the criminalisation of the conflicted person, but only of the briber who induced the 
conflict. lt is immaterial whether the official in fact takes the decision expected by him. 
He does not even need to be aware that he has been offered such an advantage with this 
aim in mind. The criminal act of active bribery is, according to the OECD Convention, 
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With the wave of privatisations in the 1990s (i.e. the choice of a 
private law-cloth for public institutions, the increased for-profit eco-
nomic engagement of states, the outsourcing of tasks performed in the 
public interests and the dissolution of former state monopolies in 
infrastructure), the limitation of the offence of bribing to the formally 
public sphere was realised as being too narrow. The Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999 obliges states parties 
to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law both active 
and passive bribery in the private sector. 133 In consequence, numerous 
states introduced such offences. In those jurisdictions, it is a criminal 
offence for persons who direct, or work for, private sector entities, 
to request or receive undue advantages in order to act or refrain 
from acting in breach of their (private law-based, normally contract-
ual) duties for their employer or firm. 134 With the extension of this 
offence, the legislators have reacted to the increasing blurriness of the 
spheres of public and private law and governance, and have themselves 
contributed to it. 
The result is that, from the perspective of many jurisdictions, 
and from an international law perspective, bribery can occur in all 
spheres of governance: public, private, and global. Indeed, both 
the UN Convention against Corruption of 2003, 135 and the Council 
completed when the briber has offered, promised, or given, the undue advantage to 
the official with the intention that the official direct his acts to the goal intended by the 
bribe. Zerbes, 'Commentary on Article l', pp. 136-137. 
133 
Arts. 7 and 8 of the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS 
No. 173 (27 January 1999). 
134 
The offence of private bribery has been introduced in the UK, France, Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland. See for the UK the Bribery Act 2010, of 8 April 2010 (chapter 23), 
ss. 1-3 (s. 2(3)(b) states that the relevant activity of the bribed person can be 'any 
activity connected with a business'). Switzerland has conceptualised this as a criminal 
act against fair competition (Art.4a 'Corruption active et passive') in the Lai federale du 
19 decembre 1986 contre la concurrence deloyale (LCD), RS 241. The US oppose such an 
offence. See Heine, Huber and Rose (eds.), Private Commercial Bribery. 
135 
Arts. 15, 16, and 21 UNCAC. UNCAC first defines bribery of national public officials as 
'(a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order 
that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) 
The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that 
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise ofhis or her official duties' (Art. 15 
UNCAC). The Convention then goes on to define the bribery of foreign public officials, 
of officials of public international organisations (Art. 16 UNCAC), and in the private 
sector (Art. 21) in a similar way. 
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of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999 136 address 
bribery in all three spheres. 
7. Why study conflict of interest? 
The difficulty of managing, and indeed already of defining conflict of 
interest, to some extent has to do with evolving attitudes and expectations 
of the general public. The pure fact of formulating the concept of conflict 
of interest is in itself a sign of a political ( and corporate) culture pro-
foundly impregnated by a concern for justice. There is no conflict of 
interest where the law confounds itself with the interest of the most 
powerful. The holder of power is not in conflict with himself. 137 In the 
last decades, the public standard of morality has become stricter. 'Previ-
ously acceptable conduct ... is now deemed unethical and previously 
unethical conduct is now deemed criminal.' 138 
But is public concern about a putative decline of ethics of public 
officials ( or of bankers and managers) a distorted perception? The 
general worry might exceed the formal evidence of unethical behaviour, 
partly because of increased media coverage. In fact, it is difficult to find 
empirically whether conflict of interest is really increasing, or whether 
only its perception is more acute. Activities of regulators on all levels of 
governance have been mostly 'scandal-driven'. Corporate breakdowns, 
the global financial crisis and numerous political scandals, have been 
imputed to conflicts of interest besetting decision-makers. But is this 
imputation justified? A comparative study on conflict of interest of high 
public offi.cials in European states found 'no evidence that conflicts of 
. · · h,139 mterest are mcreasmg as suc . 
Still, current trends in governance suggest that there is indeed a real 
potential for more contlict of interest, and that conflict of interest is not 
just a chimera. Intimes of globalisation, conflict of interest has become a 
structural problem of decision-making and thus of governance. The first 
reason is that globalisation implies on the one side interconnectedness, 
organisational growth and concentration of power in some hands, but 
136 Arts. 2-11 Council of Eutope Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173 
(27 January 1999). For example, Arts. 9-11 relate to bribery of officials of international 
organisations, international parliamentary assemblies, and international judges. 
137 Dufresne, Conflits d'interets. 
138 Anechiarico and Jacobs, The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity, p. 16. 
139 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 138. 
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on the other side also an increased division of labour, more specialisa-
tion and the need for a very high level of expertise. That demand for very 
special expertise in turn requires reliance on dense networks of initiated 
persons. lt also favours the revolving door phenomenon, i.e. the quick 
shift of specialists from dient to dient, which indudes their enhanced 
mobility between the public and private sector. 
In the world of commercialised legal counselling, for example, law firms 
have become much bigger and spread over various countries and their 
( corporate) dients as weil. The relationship between them is more anonym-
ous. Law firms are selected not because of personal trust between dient and 
attorney but based on the expertise of the entire firm. Often a dient chooses 
a firm which represented the opposing side in a previous transaction 
because the dient was impressed by that firm's performance. Also, clients 
hire not only one lawyer, but a number of specialised firms. For a huge law 
firm with subsidies, avoiding simultaneous or subsequent representation of 
various parties to a transaction or a litigation becomes difficult. Very strict 
and rigid self-regulation for lawyers representing parties in lawsuits, e.g. the 
rules by the Law Society of England and Wales on conflict of interest, with 
blanket prohibitions for solicitors of simultaneous and successive represen-
tation of certain dients, are for these reasons perceived tobe outdated, 'out 
of touch with commercial reality', and are therefore not complied with by 
the law firms (by their own account). 140 
In line with the new demands, public administration has evolved. 
Generally speaking, the more the administrative activity moves beyond 
the traditional role of autonomous-top-down enforcement of objectives, 
public interests dearly defined by statutory law, the more the adminis-
tration is entrusted with balancing interests and resolving conflicts, the 
more administrative and organisational safeguards of impartiality, 
induding conflict of interest management, are needed. 141 
Additionally, the ideals of 'new public management! have transformed 
the administration in the direction of decentralised public services, 
with an improved customer and citizen orientation, which has moreover 
outsourced some tasks. In particular, the new forms of relationships 
between the public sector, business and NGOs (public-private-partner-
ships, multi-stakeholder initiatives and sponsorships), have decreased the 
distance and thus the independence of the societal actors from each 
other. But the involvement of private actors in public administration is 
140 Griffiths-Baker, Serving Two Masters, p. 17 4. 141 Fehling, Verwaltung, p. 510. 
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ambivalent. Their private personal interests are on the one hand a risk 
for the impartial pursuance of the public good. On the other hand, the 
actor's self-interestedness is also a powerful stimulus, which can and is 
indeed instrumentalised in order to obtain a more effective and effi-
cient performance of administrative tasks. 142 
All these interlinked phenomena create new options for undue influ-
ence and thus bear the potential for new forms of conflict of interest. So 
maybe the question must be studied separately for sub-issues of conflict 
of interest. lt is - for example - likely that conflict of interest due to post-
office private employment of former public officials is increasing, and also 
conflict of interest due to secondary activities of office-holders. 143 
The whole issue has therefore on good ground attracted scholarly 
interest. Recent sociological, legal and philosophical scholarship has 
either studied conflict of interest in specific professions, 144 in corporate 
14s . h fi . 1 . 146 I . 1 .fi governance or m t e nancia servrces sector. n pnvate aw, spec1 c 
questions such as self-contracting have been studied.147 With regard to 
ethics in the professions, several works relate to legal practice, ranging 
from handbooks on the law as it stands in a particular jurisdiction 148 to 
sociological studies. 149 
142 Ibid., pp. 354 and 511. 
143 Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest, p. 122. 
144 Davis and Stark ( eds.), Conflict of Interest in the Professions studies conflict of interest, from a 
multidisciplinary perspective, in a host of professions ranging from joumalism 
over engineering and academics to health care. Moore et al. ( eds.), Conflicts of Interest 
stud.ies the issue in various professions, mostly from a business administration and psycho-
logical perspective. 
145 See on stock corporations under Swiss law Lazopoulos, Interessenkonflikte und Verantwort-
lichkeit des fiduziarischen Verwaltungsrates; on stock corporations under German law: 
Krebs, Interessenkonflikte bei Aufsichtsratsmandaten in der Aktiengesellschaft; Baumanns, 
Rechtsfolgen einer Interessenkollision bei AG-Vorstandsmitgliedern; on stock corporations 
under French law: Dominique Schmidt, Les conflits d'interets dans la societe anonyme. 
146 Chizu Nakajima and Elisabeth Sheffield, Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls; Crockett 
et al., Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry, covering investment banking, 
accounting, rating agencies, and universal banking. Thevenoz and Bahar, Conflict of 
Interest study corporate govemance, in particular executive compensation, financial 
analysis, and asset management. 
147 See for Swiss law Schott, Insichgeschäft und Interessenkonflikt; for a comparison of German 
and English law Festner, Interessenkonflikte im deutschen und englischen Vertretungsrecht. 
148 Hollander and Salzedo, Conflicts of Interest is a handbook addressed at practitioners in 
the conflict of interest law for solicitors, barristers, accountants, financial estate agents 
and insurance brokers in England and Wales. 
149 Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties concentrates on private law practice within the state of Illinois. 
Griffiths-Baker, Serving Two Masters is a study on solicitors in England and Wales. 
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The most important academic works on conflict of interest in the 
public sphere (in the public administration and with regard to political 
office-holders) have focused on the United States, where the concept has 
been developed already in the nineteenth century. 150 The most compre-
hensive comparative survey is a 2007 study conducted on the relevant 
rules for the holders of higher public and political office ( excluding 
ordinary public employees or civil servants) in the EU-27 and the EU 
institutions, carried out on behalf of the European Commission Bureau 
of European Policy Advisers. 151 Other comparative investigation on 
conflict of interest regulation has been conducted notably with regard 
to European states, the US, and Canada. 152 
Conflict of interest is an intriguing subject of research because it is a 
borderline concept in the intersection of law and morality. This situa-
tedness in itself immediately raises the deep question of the limits of the 
law and of regulation, and underscores the importance of the cultural 
context for regulation. For sure, conflict of interest requires an interdis-
ciplinary study, using legal, sociological, psychological, philosophical, 
and economic methods. 
Secondly, conflict of interest is an intriguing subject of study because 
it is elusive and difficult to seize. lt is difficult to define in the abstract 
150 
See the classic study by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Special 
Committee on the Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, Conflict of lnterest and Federal 
Service. See more recently Stark, Conflict of lnterest in American Public Life. 
151 
Demmke et al., Regulating Conflicts of Interest. That study analyses the laws, regulations, 
and codes of conduct for members of government, members of parliament, judges of 
highest courts, members or directors of courts of audit and central or national banks in 
EU member states and the EU institutions. It was carried out by a network of research-
ers from the European Institute of Public Administration, various European univer-
sities, in cooperation with the European Public Administration Network which is 
composed of governmental officials from all EU member states. 
152 
Saint-Martin and Thompson, Public Ethics and Governance (mostly from a political 
science perspective); Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the Nether-
lands/Utrecht School of Governance, Catalogue of promising practices in the field of 
integrity, anti-corruption and administrative measures against organized crime in the EU 
(The Hague, 2008); OECD and Manuel Villoria-Mendieta, Conflict of Interest Policies 
and Practices in Nine EU Member States: A Comparative Review, SIGMA papers No. 36 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005; also GOV/SIGMA(2006)1/REV1); Trost and Gash, 
Conflict of lnterest and Public Life, comparing the conflict of interest regulation dis-
course in public governance across four Western democracies (US, UK, Canada and 
Italy) based on democratic theory. See for a specific conflict of interest constellation 
OECD, Avoiding Conflict of lnterest in Post-Employment: Cornparative Overview of 
Prohibitions, Restrictions, and lmplementing Measures in OECD-Countries, GOV/PGC/ 
ETH(2006)3 (Paris 26-27 January 2006). 
..... 
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what a conflict of interest is, and how to know it when we see it. lt may 
well be that the term is applied too generously, both in theory and in 
practice, and that this broadness rather obscures than illuminates the 
underlying problems we seek to address when using the term. 153 
Thirdly, the study of conflict of interest is important from the perceptive 
of regulatory theory. Overall, corporate, public, and criminal law 
approaches to conflict of interest, channelled by international rules, prin-
ciples, and guidelines, are increasingly viewed as complementing each 
other. Worldwide, the overall regulatory approach is becoming holistic, 
involving private, administrative, and criminal law, domestic and inter-
national law, hard and soft law. This comprehensive approach is, it is 
submitted, in principle suited to manage the risk field of conflict of interest. 
However, while rules and codes have greatly increased in quantity, there is 
still insecurity about the right regulatory mix: until what point does self-
regulation suffice? At which place must and may criminal law legitimately 
step in? There is also insecurity about the rules' quality: what are the right 
standards? Are there 'correct' standards across different spheres of govern-
ance, and across different legal and administrative and corporate cultures? 
Finally, there is insecurity about the appropriate density of regulation. 
Already, some observers consider the field tobe over-regulated, and deplore 
the legalistic approach. Does not this manifest a decline of ( or declining 
confidence in) generally shared and generally observed ethical standards of 
office-holders and professionals? 
lt seems that these questions can only be answered on the basis of 
cross-cutting analyses of the issue, which do not limit themselves to the 
traditional departments of corporate law, administrative law, and public 
international law. Therefore, conflict of interest needs to be studied in a 
comparative fashion, across different levels and sectors of governance. In 
settings apparently radically different such as the board of directors of an 
American or European multinationally active stock corporation, a town 
council in Africa or the staff of an international organisation, similar 
patterns and problems might be revealed. Inversely, comparative study 
might bring to light that the problems are too different in the different 
spheres to be meaningfully related to each other, and that no common 
solutions can be suggested. Ultimately therefore, this book is intended to 
exemplify the utility (or futility) of (comparative) governance studies. 
153 See for a discussion supra, pp. 4-6. 
ANNE PETERS 
This book approaches conflict of interest as a cross-cutting problem of 
governance. Concomitantly, it consists of five parts: I. General; II. Global 
governance; III. Public governance; IV. Corporate and financial 
governance and the professions; V. Conclusion. Within the General Part 
I, this chapter has established a common framework, followed by two 
conceptual chapters, authored by a sociologist and a philosopher, 
respectively ( Chapters 2 and 3). Besides the various theoretical and 
systematic chapters, some chapters are based on empirical research, 
notably the chapters on public servants ( Chapter 10, written by econo-
mists); of members of parliament ( Chapter 11, written by a political 
scientist); on administrators and heads of government in developing 
countries (Chapters 12 and 13, authored by a social anthropologist 
and a lawyer, respectively), and on decision-making at the end of life 
(Chapter 18, written by a sociologist). Two chapters are saturated with 
the practical experience of the authors in international or corporate 
governance, notably Chapters 4 (written by a legal officer in the OECD), 
and Chapter 14 (written by a compliance practitioner). 
The chapters identify when a conflict of interest is present, they 
investigate why and when it is a problem in that particular context 
( and when it is not). They explore mechanisms for managing the conflict, 
ranging from non-regulation over self- and co-regulation to contractual 
arrangements and statutory prohibitions accompanied by administrative 
fines or even penal sanctions. The concluding Chapter 19 draws together 
the insights from the various disciplines and systematises the findings 
relating to the different levels, types, and branches of governance. 
2 
Conflict of interest from the perspective of the 
sociology of organised action 
ERHARD FRIEDBERG* 
1. Introduction 
Conflict of interest is a well-known phenomenon. It has a long history in 
the sociology of the professions, where it refers to situations where 
professionals with fiduciary duties to some other person ( a dient for a 
lawyer, a patient for a doctor, 1 to mention the most analysed examples) 
are influenced in their professional practice by interests that are foreign 
to those of their clients and which therefore interfere with the proper 
exercise of their fiduciary duties.2 Conflict of interest is also a much-
discussed notion today. In these days of stock-exchange scandals, demise 
ofbanks, high dependence on experts whose judgement and advice often 
does turn out to be biased by their own situational interests, widespread 
bouts of corruption even in the developed countries, and other ethical 
problems assailing our capitalist order, its use has been widened to be 
applied to situations outside of the classical profession. And most of the 
discussion takes on an ethical, if not a moralising tone, and seems to be 
emotionally and normatively loaded with reprobation and disapproval. 
The reference to conflict of interest designates not only situations where 
* I want to thank Olivier Borraz, Frank Dobbin, Christine Musselin and Michael Storper, 
whose critical rernarks and suggestions have helped rne to irnprove a first version of this 
chapter. I also want to extend rny special thanks to Daniel Högger whose editorial and 
bibliographical assistance was inestirnable. As usual, I alone am responsible for the 
rernaining errors and inadequacies of this chapter. 
1 See in this regard Shapiro, 'Conflict of interest at the bedside: surrogate decision-rnaking 
at the end of life: Chapter 18 in this volurne. 
2 This is rnore or less the sense of the canonical definition of conflict of interest by Davis 
and Stark: 'A person has a conflict of interest if, and only if, that person is in a relationship 
with another requiring the exercise of judgrnent on the other's behalf and that person has 
a (special) interest tending to interfere with the proper exercise of such judgrnent.' Davis, 
'Introduction', p. 8. 
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